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Abstract
In this article we estimate the influence of leadership changes on the
operational dynamics associated with terrorist attacks conducted by the
Islamic State and its predecessors. Because the focus of our research is
empirical, the study uses data for 2,131 successful attacks between
October 2002 and December 2014 to examine differentials in operational
tempo, attack severity, primary tactics employed, and principal targets.
The data are aggregated on a monthly basis to estimate the probabilities
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associated with specific attack sequences in terms of the following
primary tactics: (1) firearms, (2) explosives, (3) hostage-taking/
kidnapping, and (4) attacks involving combinations of (1), (2), and/or (3).
The analysis is placed in a broad historical and strategic context in order
to explore two key issues: (1) The effect of leadership change on terrorist
group activity and (2) The implications for counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency efforts. Our analysis reveals a myriad of conceptual,
theoretical, and policy implications.
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Introduction 
The centrality of leadership has long been a key tenet of organizational theory.  In the literature, we find a wide 
variety of studies focusing on the role that leaders play in shaping both operational and organizational success.1  
This is particularly true of charismatic individuals central to clandestine entities such as criminal enterprises or 
terrorist groups who may influence many aspects of their organizations that encompass identity, structure, and 
operations.2  Case studies such as Peru’s Sendero Luminso (Shining Path) demonstrate leadership decapitation 
including targeted assassinations have caused terrorist campaigns to end and for groups to cease operations if the 
transition to a new leader is unsuccessful.3  By contrast, other studies have concluded decapitation strategies may 
have no measurable impact or be counterproductive.4  As a result, the impact of leadership on continuity and 
                                                 
1 Sinan Aral and Dylan Walker, “Identifying influential and susceptible members of social networks,” Science 337, no. 6092 (2012): 
337–341; John G.R. Dyer, Anders Johansson, Dirk Helbing, Iain D. Couzin, and Jens Krause, “Leadership, Consensus Decision 
Making and Collective Behavior in Humans,” Philosophical Transactions Royal Society B 364 (2009): 781–789; Victor M. 
Eguíluz, Martin G. Zimmermann, Camilo J. Cela-Conde, and Maxi San Miguel, “Cooperation and the Emergence of Role 
Differentiation in the Dynamics of Social Networks,” American Journal of Sociology 110, no. 4 (2005): 977–1008; Mario Diani, 
“‘Leaders’ or brokers? Positions and Influence in Social Movement Networks,” in Social movements and networks: relational 
approaches to collective action eds. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003); Robert R. 
Blake and Jane S. Mouton, “Theory and Research for Developing a Science of Leadership,” Journal of Applied Behavioural 
Science 18, no. 3 (1982): 275-291; Fred E. Fielder, A Ttheory of Lleadership Effectiveness (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967); Rocco 
Carzo Jr., “Some Effects of Organization Structure on Group Effectiveness,” Administrative Science Quarterly 7, no. 4 (1963): 393–
424; Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1961); Oscar Grusky, 
“Administrative Succession in Formal Organizations,” Social Forces 39 (1960): 105–115; Max Weber, The Theory of Social and 
Economic Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1947). 
2 Andrew R. Molnar, William A. Lybrand, Loma Hahn, James L. Kirkmand, and Peter B. Riddleberger, Undergrounds, 
Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (Washington, DC: Special Operations Research Office, 1963), available at: 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/436353.pdf. 
3 Patrick B. Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency 
Campaigns,” International Security 36, no. 4 (2012): 47-79; Audrey K. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline 
and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Cynthia McClintock, Revolutionary 
Movements in Latin America (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998). 
4 Jenna Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark,” International Security 38, no. 4 (2014): 7-38; Blake W. Mobley, 
Terrorism and Counterintelligence: How Terrorist Groups Elude Detection (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Bryan 
C. Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists,” International Security 36 (2012): 9–46; Zaryab Iqbal and Christopher Zorn, “The Political 
Consequences of Assassination,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 3 (2008): 385–400; Aaron Mannes, “Testing the Snake 
Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing Its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group’s Activity?” Journal of International Policy 
Solutions 9 (2008): 40–49; Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 102–104; Victor D. 
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change in the operational dynamics of terrorist attacks, especially groups that function with leadership 
transitions spanning multiple years, remains an open research question with implications for counterterrorism 
and counterinsurgency policy. 
 
Terrorist groups that manage to sustain organizational viability over a multi-year period are dynamic, networked 
organizations capable of adaptive behaviors that promote group stability.5  Modern terrorist organizations also 
are often composed of quasi-independent cells with distributed or decentralized command and control 
structures.6  Given these attributes, we expect successful jihadist terrorist organizations adapt rapidly to shifting 
circumstances and are difficult to destabilize.  This is not surprising because The 2014-2015 Report Card on 
International Cooperation produced by the Council of Councils, which draws on 25 leading foreign policy 
institutes from around the world roughly tracking the composition of the G20, ranked combatting transnational 
terrorism as the third highest priority global challenge for 2015.7  The report noted the emergence of Islamic State 
(IS), also referred to as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL - original name for the group in Arabic was 
Al-Dawla Al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham sometimes transliterated as Daesh) or the Islamic State in Iraq and 
al-Syria (ISIS) unambiguously underscores the difficulty inherent in preventing terrorism.  In fact, IS has been 
able to maintain group cohesion, stage attacks, and control territory despite three leadership transitions 
stemming from targeted assassinations. 
                                                 
Hyder, Decapitation Operations (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2004); Lisa Langdon, Alexander J. 
Sarapu, and Matthew Wells, “Targeting the Leadership of Terrorist and Insurgent Movements: Historical Lessons for 
Contemporary Policy Makers,” Journal of Public and International Affairs 15 (2004): 59–78. 
5 Stanley McChrystal, Tantum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris Fussell, Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a 
Complex World (New York: Penguin, 2015); Tara A. Leweling and Mark E. Nissen, “Defining and Exploring the Terrorism Tield,” 
Technological Forecasting & Social Change 74 (2007): 165-192; Brian A. Jackson, John C. Baker, Kim Cragin, John V. Parachini, 
and Horacio R. Trujillo, Aptitude for Destruction, Volume 2, MG-332-NIJ (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2005); Euell Elliott and 
Lowell D. Kiel, “A Complex Systems Approach for Developing Public Policy Toward Terrorism, Chaos,” Solitons and Fractals 20 
(2004): 63-68; Joshua M. Epstein, “Modeling Civil Violence,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99 (2002): 7243-
7250; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001); Martha Crenshaw, “An 
Organization Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism,” Orbis 29 (1985): 465–489; Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch, 
“Differentiation and Integration in Complex Organizations,” Administrative Science Quarterly 12, no. 1 (1967): 1-47. 
6 Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens and David N. Edger, Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2009). 
7 Council on Foreign Relations, Council of Councils Report Card on International Cooperation 2014-2015, (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2015), available at: http://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/reportcard/#!/. 
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Although determining how to attack dynamic, networked organizations—let alone figuring out how they are likely 
to evolve, change, and adapt—is terribly difficult, it nevertheless is essential for successful counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency.8  The assessment of destabilization strategies applied to terrorist groups, particularly those 
that mature into insurgencies and/or social movements, poses a number of key questions including: What are the 
primary tactics and targets of the group’s terrorist campaign?  Do the tactics and targets evolve over time?  What 
tactic is likely to be used next if a group employs tactic x for an attack?  Consequently, what analytical techniques 
elucidate continuity and change in the operational dynamics of inherently covert entities given that we will be 
working with incomplete information?  
 
In this article, we examine the operational tempo, attack severity, choice of tactics and targets, and independence 
of attack sequences used by IS and its predecessors for the period that begins in 2002 and ends in 2014.  By 
focusing on IS, we examine a major adversarial threat which has experienced changes in of leadership over an 
extended time frame that spans more than 12 years.  Moreover, the broader strategic environment within which 
IS and its predecessors have operated has also changed over time.  Hence, it provides potential insights to explore 
two key issues:  What is the effect of leadership change on terrorist group activity measured in terms of attack 
intensity (i.e., frequency), attack severity (i.e., casualties), targets, and tactics?  What are the implications for 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts?   
 
Evolution of the Islamic State 
Evolving out of a series of predecessor organizations, the Islamic State is the most recent name used by one of the 
leading transnational jihadist groups based in the Middle East.9  As the name implies, IS has a pan-Islamic 
                                                 
8 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams; Mobley, Terrorism and Counterintelligence; Springer et al., Islamic Radicalism and Global 
Jihad; Kathleen M. Carley et al., “Destabilization of covert networks,” Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory 12, 
no. 1 (2006): 51-66; Elsayed Ahmed, Ahmed S. Elgazzar, and Ahmed S. Hegazi, “On Complex Adaptive Systems and Terrorism,” 
Physics Letters A 337, no. 2 (2005): 127-129; Robert P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1984). 
9 Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS (New York: Ecco, 2015); James Fromson and Steven Simon, “ISIS,” Survival 57 (2015): 7-56; 
Ariel I. Ahram, “Sexual Violence and the Making of ISIS,” Survival 57 (2015): 57-77; Richard Barrett, Patrick Skinner, Robert 
McFadden, and Lila Ghosh, The Islamic State (New York: The Soufan Group, 2014). 
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agenda and announced in June 2014 that it had established a self-proclaimed caliphate (al-Khilafah in Arabic).  
The group’s primary area of operation encompasses portions of Iraq, Syria, and the Levant; it controls territory 
within both Iraq and Syria.  In addition, several radical Islamist groups in sub-Saharan Africa including al-
Shabaab and Boko Haram as well as elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan have declared allegiance to the IS.   
 
First appearing under the name ISIL in April 2013, the origins of the IS can be traced back to Jama'at al-Tawhid 
wal-Jihad (Arabic for Jihad Organization of Monotheism and Jihad) which was founded in 2002 under the 
charismatic and brutal leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian with links to al-Qa’ida starting in 
1999.10  Tawhid wal-Jihad conducted its first documented successful terrorist attack in 2002 when it killed 
Lawrence Foley, a US Agency for International Development staffer working in Amman, Jordan.   
 
With the 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq and subsequent Sunni insurgency, al-Zarqawi shifted the group’s 
primary focus from Jordan to Iraq.  Commonly referred to as the al-Zarqawi Network, it primarily operated 
within a 13,531.7 km2 triangular area bounded by Baqubah on the east side of the triangle, Baghdad on the south 
side, Ramadi on the west side, and Tikrit on the north or apex side.11  In 2004, al-Zarqawi swore bay’ah, an oath 
of loyalty to Usama bin Laden.  The group then changed its name to reflect its formal alignment with al-Qa’ida.  It 
became Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, commonly called al-Qa’ida in Iraq or AQI.12  AQI 
embraced a highly fundamentalist interpretation of Islam grounded in the Salafi tradition and viewed all those 
who deviated from its perspective as apostates or infidels, a worldview that remained constant throughout the 
group’s existence.13  Although now called AQI, Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn was designated a 
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on December 17, 2004 by the US Department of State in accordance with 
Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.14 
 
                                                 
10 Joby Warrick, Black Flags (New York: Doubleday, 2016); David Kilcullen, Blood Year (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2016); Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS (New York: Regan Arts, 2015); McChrystal et al., Team of Teams; Springer et al., 
Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad. 
11 Springer et al., Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad. 
12 M.J. Kirdar, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011). 
13 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS; Springer et al., Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad. 
14 US Department of State, List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2016), available at: 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 
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A targeted US airstrike in June 2006 during the Anbar Awakening (Ḥarakat al-Ṣaḥwah al-Sunnīyah) killed Al-
Zarqawi and the group’s leadership passed to Abu Ayub al-Masri, an Egyptian national.  Shortly after Zarqawi’s 
death, AQI combined with several smaller extremist groups and once again renamed itself.  AQI re-branded itself 
as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)—a change that reflected the group’s efforts to hold and control territory as well 
as its ambition to obtain universal leadership of the Islamic community—and joined the Mujahidin Shura 
Council.15  Following the successful leadership transition, al-Masri served as ISI’s leader along with Abu Omar al-
Qurashi al-Baghdadi—an Iraqi national—until US and Iraqi forces killed them in April 2010. 
 
Immediately following the death of al-Masri, IS again successfully executed a leadership transition and Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi, another Iraqi national, became IS’s leader.  Under al-Baghdadi, ISI initially focused its attention on 
recruiting new members, attracting support within some segments of Iraq’s minority Sunni community, and on 
attacking the Shi’ite dominated regime of Nuri al-Maliki.  The early 2011 outbreak of the Syrian civil war, which 
began as an uprising against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, lead ISI to send some of its militants into eastern 
Syria.  By early 2012, the Syrian civil war was undergoing a dramatic intensification in the level of violence 
drawing growing Sunni resistance to the Assad regime.  ISIS certainly played a part in the ramping up of the 
Syrian civil war, but only one part, and a smaller one at the time than it does now.16  For example, in April 2013, 
al-Baghdadi announced his intention to combine his forces in Iraq and Syria with Jabhat al-Nusra—commonly 
called the al-Nusrah Front, an al-Qa’ida affiliate aligned with Ayman al-Zawahiri—under the name Islamic State 
in Iraq and the Levant.  Al-Baghdad’s group rebranded itself as ISIL.  However, al-Nusrah rejected the proposed 
merger.  The decision not to merge caused the two Islamist groups to compete for recruits and eventually resulted 
in open fighting between ISIL and the al-Nusrah Front.   
 
As the civil war in Syria evolved into an insurgency, ISIL quickly established control over territory in eastern 
Syria centered on the town of al-Raqqah.  The group imposed a strict version of shari’ah law and attracted 
significant numbers of radicalized foreign fighters including westerners.  IISL seized critical infrastructure in 
eastern Syria and portions of Iraq.  It also gained affiliates from jihadist groups outside the Middle East.  
                                                 
15 Springer et al., Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad. 
16 Charles R. Lister, The Syrian Jihad (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse (New 
York: St. Martin’s, 2015). 
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In June 2014, al-Baghdadi proclaimed himself as caliph and renamed the group IS.  Since then, IS has launched 
attacks in the Middle East and sought to inspire attacks in the West.17  Throughout 2016, the group lost 
substantial amounts of previously controlled territory in Syria and Iraq, with Mosul the only major Iraqi city 
remaining under IS occupation as of early-January 2017.  The loss of controlled territory is primarily due to 
Russian and Iranian intervention in the Syrian civil war combined with Western support for the Kurdish People’s 
Defense Units (YPG) in Syria and Peshmerga (IPA) based in the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan.  While 
facing battlefield setbacks in Syria and Iraq, it has expanded into the North Africa, especially Libya, and launched 
successful attacks in Europe and inspired attacks in the US.  This pattern is consistent with the finding in the 
literature that terrorist attacks typically ramp up and cluster in civil wars.18  In fact, the data we examine for this 
research reveal the initial surge in attacks conducted by AQI under Zarqawi’s leadership tied directly to the 
insurgency in Iraq that emerged after the fall of Saddam Hussein.  This underscores the need to differentiate 
between classic terrorist groups that do not mature into insurgents and/or social movements and those that do 
when considering the group’s operational dynamics.  We opt to focus on one that has made the transition. 
 
Data 
Because the focus of our research is empirical, the statistical analysis presented in this study employs information 
obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).  We chose to use the GTD because it is a publically available 
open-source dataset that contains information on 2,450 IS attacks conducted through December 2014.19  A more 
comprehensive dataset including attacks beyond that period was unavailable.  As noted above, the label Islamic 
State is the most recent re-branding or name adopted by one of the most violent Salafi jihadist groups that has 
been operational since 2002.  Hence, we include attacks conducted by Tawhid and Jihad, al-Qa`ida in Iraq, 
Mujahedeen Shura Council, Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), and The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in this 
analysis to capture the group’s operational dynamics since its first emerged as Tawhid and Jihad. 
                                                 
17 Warrick, Black Flags; Weiss and Hassan, ISIS; Stern and Berger, ISIS; Fromson and Simon, “ISIS”; Ahram, “Sexual violence 
and the making of ISIS”; Barrett et al., The Islamic State. 
18 Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young, “Terrorism and Civil War: A Spatial and Temporal Approach to a Conceptual 
Problem,” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 2 (2012): 285-305. 
19 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database (College Park, MD: 
START), last modified June, 2015, available at: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. 
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Information in the GTD comes from media reporting of individual attacks.20  Because the reliability of sources 
may vary substantially over time and/or political jurisdiction, information must be documented by a minimum of 
one independent, high-quality primary source (i.e., presumably free of influence by other interested parties) that 
routinely report externally verifiable content in order to be included in the GTD.  We recognize underreporting of 
the total number of successful attacks in areas where the media sources are distinctly biased and/or the 
government controls information flows may happen.  With respect to terrorist groups such as IS, however, 
potential underreporting bias is likely to be relatively modest taken together given the emergence of social media 
and other non-traditional electronic media sources.  Moreover, in the study we are not constrained to a small 
number of events; rather we have analyzed several thousand successful attacks occurring over multiple years.  In 
addition, because the data are publicly available, this facilitates either verification or replication of our analysis.  
Consequently, we are confident the GTD is the best source of publicly available data and appropriate for this 
study.   
 
We employed a series of filters to construct the analysis dataset by querying the GTD for all successful events 
attributed to IS to screen out ambiguous incidents that do not involve terrorism.  First, the violent act seeks to 
attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal.  Second, there is evidence of an intention to coerce, 
intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience or audiences than the immediate victims.  Third, 
the action is outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, insofar as it targets non-combatants (i.e., the act 
must be outside the parameters permitted by the Law of Armed Conflict and by international humanitarian law 
as reflected in the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and elsewhere).  The GTD 
also incorporates a doubt factor for inclusion of otherwise ambiguous cases for which the weight-of-evidence 
indicates the incident is an act of terrorism.   
 
Applying these initial filters resulted in n = 2,131 successful IS terrorist attacks that meet the above criteria.  This 
provides a sufficient number of attacks conducted over a period spanning more than 12 years (147 months) 
between October 2002 and December 2014 with which to evaluate the impact of leadership periods on continuity 
and change in the operational dynamics of terrorist attacks.   
                                                 
20 Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan, “Introducing the Global Terrorism Database,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19:2 (2007): 
181-204. 
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Results and Discussion 
We examine a series of metrics in order to have multiple indicators of continuity and change in the operational 
dynamics of Islamic State’s terrorist campaign.  First, we consider the group’s operational tempo measured by the 
frequency distribution of attacks per month.  Next, we assess the severity of each attack in terms of the number of 
individuals killed, injured, and taken hostage per event.  Third, we assess the joint distribution of attacks over 
tactics and targets.  Fourth, we evaluate the predictability of attacks based on patterns identified in the observed 
sequences of attacks using Markov state transition modeling.  We opt to use these metrics because they capture 
key features of the operational dynamics of a terrorist group over time.  Moreover, such open source information 
tends to be readily available and verifiable unlike alternative metrics such as material support, mobilization, and 
recruitment. 
 
Our analysis is grouped based on the three IS leadership periods described above.  The first two leadership 
periods (al-Zarqawi and al-Masri respectively) were both 45 months in duration.  As of November 2016, the 
current leadership period under al-Baghdadi has continued for 68 months since April 2010.  Our analysis of the 
current leadership period is restricted to a 57-month time period ending in December 2014 because 2015 and 
2016 validated data are unavailable.  Table 1 contains the basic details related to each leadership period.  Here, 
we note the sum of the attacks perpetrated by the three different leaders (n = 2,030) identified in Table 1 is not 
equal to the total number of IS attacks (n = 2,131) because only a single attack was conducted during the brief 
transition between al-Zarqawi’s death and al-Masri assuming his leadership role.   
 
Table 1.  Islamic State leadership period information. 
Leader  Start End Number of Months Total Number of Attacks 
Abu Musab  
al-Zarqawi 
October 2002 June 2006 45 100 
Abu Ayyub 
 al-Masri 
July 2006 March 2010 45 202 
Abu Bakr  
al-Baghdadi 
April 2010 December 2014* 57 1828 
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*Data availability for the al-Baghdadi leadership period ends in December 2014, however, his leadership of IS has continued to at 
least mid-November 2016. 
 
Operational Tempo 
Operational tempo provides an indicator of the ability of a terrorist organization to sustain a campaign.  
Presumably, groups that are more capable have a greater capacity to operate at a higher operational tempo over a 
longer time interval than do less successful groups.  In essence, it is plausible to assume that terrorist groups that 
survive because they are able to maintain or increase their share of inflicted brutality during their lifetimes 
making committing terrorist acts necessary for group survival.21  In this case, we use the number of successful 
attacks conducted in a month as a measure of operational tempo.   
 
Figure 1 depicts the number of successful attacks per month conducted by each IS leader.  The horizontal x-axis 
for time indicates the month number associated with each of the three leadership periods.  The vertical y-axis is 
the number of successful attacks conducted by the group.  The data are time shifted on the x-axis in order to align 
the beginning of each leadership period.  By overlapping the start point for each series, it becomes a 
straightforward process to compare visually differences in the group’s operational tempo across the three 
leadership eras.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Peter J. Phillips, The Economics of Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2016). 
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Figure 1.  Number of Islamic State attacks per month grouped by leadership period. 
 
 
The figure demonstrates that the number of attacks/month carried out by al-Zarqawi and al-Masri tended to 
remain constant over time.  The number of attacks/month, however, increased dramatically after al-Baghdadi 
assumed his role as the current IS leader.  Under al-Baghdadi, the attacks per month increased by 614% and 
1,343% over his predecessors, al-Zarqawi and al-Masri, respectively.  A phenomenal uptick in the sheer number 
of successful attacks combined with a dramatic escalation of savagery that shows no sign of abating characterizes 
his leadership period.22 
 
We readily concede, as noted previously, that terrorist attacks happen in a context, which is fluid.  That is, the 
broader strategic and operational environment is not static, circumstances change, and the terrorist group lacks a 
monopoly on initiating action.  Hence, we are not asserting that this change is solely due to leadership transition 
but that leadership transitions per se did not automatically diminish the group’s operational capacity.  Indeed, as 
IS evolved, it survived leadership decapitation and simultaneously functioned as a terrorist group and an 
                                                 
22 Warrick, Black Flags; Kilcullen, Blood Year; Weiss and Hassan, ISIS; Stern and Berger, ISIS. 
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insurgent group in recent years.  As a result, it certainly is plausible to assume that leaders play some role in 
driving the strategy and tactics that a group pursues as a conflict evolves, particularly as it captures key areas and 
controls territory, attracts foreign fighters, and/or faces direct foreign military intervention.   
 
In fact, table 2 reveals clear differentials in operational tempo achieved by the IS under each leader, especially al-
Baghdadi in comparison to both al-Zarqawi and al-Masri.  The mean number of attacks per month by the IS 
under its current leader, al-Baghdadi, was 32.07 through December 2014 while it averaged 2.22 attacks per 
month under al-Zarqawi and increased modestly to 4.49 attacks per month under al-Masri.  Unlike the terrorist 
campaigns waged by his predecessors, examination of the data demonstrates the group’s operational tempo has 
increased substantially under al-Baghdadi’s leadership.  This is attributable to a statistically significant 
divergence in terms of its ability to conduct successful attacks when compared to the two previous leadership 
periods (al-Baghdadi with al-Zarqawi, p ≤ 0.001 and al-Baghdadi with al-Masri, p ≤ 0.001).  On the other hand, a 
one-way ANOVA test indicates relative continuity with respect to intensity between al-Zarqawi and al-Masri.  The 
difference in operational tempo between al-Zarqawi and al-Masri for the first and second leadership periods 
respectively was stochastic; that is, attributable to chance (p > .05).   
 
Table 2.  Islamic State monthly attack statistics. 
 Abu Musab  
al-Zarqawi 
Abu Ayyub  
al-Masri 
Abu Bakr  
al-Baghdadi 
Mean  2.22 4.49 32.07 
St. Dev. 2.97 4.01 35.49 
Median 1 3 17 
 
Attack Severity Metrics 
Attack severity reflects the brutality of a single act or series of acts of terrorism in terms of deaths, injuries, 
and/or hostage taking.  From its beginnings, IS has displayed a commitment to using brutality to trigger an 
apocalyptic clash with its perceived enemies.23  Table 3 displays the attack severity metrics for each leadership 
                                                 
23 James L. Regens, Amy Schultheiss, and Nick Mould, “Regional Variation in Causes of Injuries among Terrorism Victims for 
Mass Casualty Events,” Frontiers in Public Health 3 (2015): 1-6; Kobi Peleg, Limor Aharonson-Daniel, Michael Michael, and S.C. 
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period.  The series of attacks conducted by IS and its predecessors between October 2002 and December 2014 
caused 13,661 deaths and 24,602 injuries.  In addition, the group took 3,559 hostages during that 147-month time 
span.  Not surprisingly, given the heightened operational tempo that IS has achieved under al-Baghdadi’s 
leadership, the number of people killed (68.4%), injured (59.6%), and/or taken as hostages (94.7%) has 
happened since he succeeded al-Masri in April 2010.   
 
Table 3.  Islamic State attack severity. 
  Abu Musab  
al-Zarqawi 
Abu Ayyub  
al-Masri 
 
Abu Bakr  
al-Baghdadi 
 
Deaths 
Number Events 98 201 1708 
Total 1616 2699 9346.13 
Mean 16.49 13.43 5.47 
St.  Dev. 27.33 26.27 23.63 
Median 4.5 4 2 
Injuries 
Number Events 88 190 1643 
Total 3112 6837 14653.23 
Mean 35.36 35.98 8.92 
St.  Dev. 74.39 84.30 15.18 
Median 7.5 7 5 
Hostages 
Number Events 19 17 179 
Total 48 140 3371 
Mean 2.53 8.24 18.83 
St.  Dev. 1.81 8.01 39.86 
Median 2 4 3 
 
The results of a one-way ANOVA indicate statistically significant differences among the leadership periods for 
deaths (p ≤ 0.001) and injuries (p ≤ 0.001).  As was the case with operational tempo, however, the differences are 
really between al-Baghdadi and his predecessors and not between al-Zarqawi and al-Masri.  There is not a 
                                                 
Shapira, “Patterns of injury in hospitalized terrorist victims,” American Journal of Emergency Medicine 21, no. 4 (2003): 258-
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significant difference between the first two leaders, al-Zarqawi and al-Masri, in terms of either the number of 
persons killed or injured in each event based on difference of means testing (p > .05).  IS simply has become a 
much more lethal terrorist group since al-Baghdadi assumed its leadership.   
 
Not surprisingly, there is a significant difference between the current IS leader, al-Baghdadi, and his two 
predecessors in terms of both the number of victims killed in successful attacks (al-Baghdadi with al-Zarqawi, p ≤ 
0.001; al-Baghdadi with al-Masri, p ≤ 0.001) and those suffering injuries (al-Baghdadi with al-Zarqawi, p ≤ 
0.001; al-Baghdadi with al-Masri, p ≤ 0.001).  Additionally, we note there is a significant reduction in the 
standard deviation associated with the number of people injured per attack between al-Baghdadi (15.18), al-
Zarqawi (84.3), and al-Masri (74.39).  We attribute this decrease in variance and the significant reduction in the 
number of persons killed per event to a reduction in the group’s reliance on suicide bombings as a primary tactic 
for its terrorist attacks during the period encompassed by our analysis.  Suicide bombings produce a large 
number of deaths per attack and a highly variable number of injuries.24 
 
Interestingly enough, prior to 2015, the severity of hostage situations measured as the mean number of hostages 
per event did not differ significantly among the leaders (p > .05).  We note, however, the scale of hostage 
taking/kidnapping, which has happened under al-Baghdadi, has increased dramatically during 2014 and 2015 as 
demonstrated by the sexual enslavement of Yazidi women from the Sinjar region of Iraq following the 
establishment of the self-proclaimed caliphate.  In fact, the Research and Fatwa Department of the Islamic State 
released a pamphlet entitled Su'al wa-Jawab fi al-Sabi wa-Riqab (“Questions and Answers on Taking Captives 
and Slaves”), which is available online in the group’s English-language Dabiq magazine, asserting that taking 
female captives and slaves is permissible under Islamic law.25  Hence, because IS abducted 5,270 Yazidi women 
and girls in August 2014 with at least 3,144 still held in August 2015 according to community leaders, it is likely 
                                                 
24 Regens et al, “Regional Variation in Causes of Injuries among Terrorism Victims for Mass Casualty Events”; Peleg et al., 
“Patterns of injury in hospitalized terrorist victims”. 
25 Rukmini Callimachi, “ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape,” New York Times, August 13, 2015, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis-enshrines-a-theology-of-rape.html?_r=0. 
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that differentials between al-Baghdadi and either al-Zarqawi or al-Masri for this metric of attack severity would 
be non-stochastic if data for all of 2015 were available for inclusion in this analysis.26 
 
Tactics and Targets 
Because terrorism itself is a tactic involving the intentional application of violence directed against specific 
targets, this raises the question of whether primary means (i.e., tactics) employed by IS and its predecessors have 
varied substantially over time.  We consider the following 10 target types: civilian, government, military, police, 
journalists/media, religious entities, infrastructure, foreign government, rival groups, and other.  In this section, 
we examine variation in the dynamics of IS attacks against those targets in terms of four primary tactics:  
 
(1) Firearms,  
(2) Explosives,  
(3) Hostage-taking/kidnapping, and  
(4) Attacks involving combinations of (1), (2), and/or (3).   
 
Tables 4, 5, and 6 (located in the appendix) contain the joint distribution of attacks over tactics and target for the 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi leadership periods.  The data presented in the set of tables indicate an initial shift in 
preferred tactics employed by the group between al-Zarqawi and al-Masri followed by a second shift in tactics 
between al-Masri and al-Baghdadi.  Al-Masri decreased reliance on hostage taking/kidnapping from 19.4% to 
9.5% of successful attacks during his tenure as the group’s leader.  At the same time, the group’s use of firearms 
increased (from 15.3% under al-Zarqawi to 21.1%) and explosives (from 65.3% under al-Zarqawi to 69.5%) as it 
increasingly transformed into an insurgency.  Consequently, the heavy reliance on firearms and explosives as 
primary tactics during the first two leadership eras reflects the intense sectarian violence between Sunnis and 
Shi’a combined with the insurgency the group waged against US, coalition, and Iraqi government forces 
                                                 
26 Middle East Media Research Institute, “Islamic State (ISIS) Releases Pamphlet On Female Slaves,” Jihad and Terrorism Threat 
Monitor (December 4, 2014), available at: http://www.memrijttm.org/islamic-state-isis-releases-pamphlet-on-female-
slaves.html. 
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throughout the period from 2003 through 2008.27  Following the 2011 withdrawal of US combat forces from Iraq, 
IS again modified its tactics under al-Baghdadi, the current IS leader.  The group decreased the use of firearms 
from its high of 21.1% during the al-Masri era to 8.2%.  On the other hand, there was a sharp increase in the use 
of explosives, which jumped from 69.5% during the al-Masri era to 81% under al-Baghdadi becoming the group’s 
dominant tactic employed in its successful attacks.  This resulted in the approximately one order of magnitude 
increase in total casualties from its attacks. 
 
We now turn to a consideration of the relationship between choice of tactic and choice of target for successful 
attacks.  Comparing the joint distributions of attack operations across the three leadership periods allows us to 
assess continuity and change in target selection paired with tactics.  To identify patterns, we include the 10 target 
types listed above and expanded the set of tactics evaluated by dividing the explosives category into three 
subcategories (vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices [VBIEDs], suicide bombing, and other explosives).  
We also included incendiary devices as a separate category and added the other category to capture any 
remaining tactics employed.   
 
Given the number of possible combinations of tactic and target pairs for each leader, it is unlikely that systematic 
mathematical comparisons of the matrices will yield results interpreted easily.  Consequently, we take a different 
approach in order to (1) elucidate the pattern for each leader and (2) compare the patterns over time between al-
Zarqawi, al-Masri, and al-Baghdadi.  We opt to identify the top three maximum likelihood (ML) operations for 
each leader based on the actual pairs of tactics and targets employed by the group during each leadership era 
between October 2002 and December 2014.  Here, we define a ML operation to be a high probability tactic-target 
combination (e.g., VBIEDs and police or suicide bombings and civilians).  This empirical approach provides the 
basis for a straightforward and intuitively understandable way to identify, compare, and contrast the relationship 
between choice of tactics and choice of targets by the three leaders.   
 
                                                 
27 Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014); David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Springer et al., Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad; Steven Simon, “The Price of the 
Surge,” Foreign Affairs 87 (2008): 57-76. 
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The data reveal that, while al-Zarqawi was leading AQI, the group primarily emphasized targeting the Iraqi police 
forces using both VBIEDs (p = 0.09) and suicide bombings (p = 0.09) in an attempt to undermine the Iraqi 
government’s ability to secure the battle space.  Al-Zarqawi also relied on hostage taking/kidnapping of civilians 
to fuel sectarian violence (p = 0.08).  Under al-Masri’s leadership, civilians became even more preferred as the 
group’s primary target for its terrorist attacks.  Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices deployed against 
civilians ranked first in terms of tactic-target pair (p = 0.11) followed by the use of firearms against civilians (p = 
0.08) and other explosives against civilians (p = 0.07).  Under al-Baghdadi, like his predecessors, IS has relied 
heavily on the use of VBIEDs and continued to employ them against civilian targets emulating the tactics 
employed under al-Masri.  In fact, use of the VBIED tactic-civilian target pair by IS has increased substantially 
since al-Baghdadi became its leader (p = 0.21).  IS also has become much more likely to use other explosives such 
as grenades to attack civilians (p = 0.17) as well as shifting back to al-Zarqawi’s original emphasis on targeting the 
police.  In the case of the later, IS relied primarily on using other explosives such as rocket-propelled grenades 
(RPGs) instead of VBIEDs or suicide bombings (p = 0.09) although those types of explosive devices have been 
used too.   
 
Interestingly enough, comparisons across the three periods (i.e., leadership eras) reveal that al-Zarqawi and al-
Masri displayed more variation in terms of the relationship between choice of tactic and choice of target for 
successful attacks.  That is, their top three MLs for tactic-target pairs accounted for a lower proportion of all 
attacks than was the case with al-Baghdadi.  Approximately 26% of their attacks involved one of either al-Zarqawi 
or al-Masri’s top three ML operations.  However, during the al-Baghdadi leadership era, much more focused 
choice of tactic and target pair is evident.  Under his leadership, IS conducted 46.5% of its attacks using the top 
three ML operations.  This shift to a highly-concentrated approach to tactics and targeting from the more diffuse 
approach in the past indicates a deliberate change over time to one that emphasizes a more limited but highly 
lethal set of tactics tied to discrete targets. 
 
Predicting Attack Tactics 
The results above raise the question of whether the tactics employed by IS during an ongoing terrorist campaign 
are predictable.  That is, can we predict the probable tactic for a subsequent attack if we know the tactic or 
combination of tactics used in an earlier successful attack?  In essence, if we know the tactics employed in the 
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immediately prior attack (subsequently referred to as ‘prior’), is it possible to predict accurately the likely tactics 
employed in subsequent attack following that event (subsequently referred to as ‘current’)? 
Calculating a state transition table allows us to address this question empirically with Markov modeling.  We 
examine the conditional probability distributions (CPDs) that compose a first-order Markov state transition 
matrix in order to determine if attack sequences are predictable.28  With a Markov model, the probability of 
observing a particular attack tactic at a particular time point (i.e., state) only depends on the attack tactic (i.e., 
state) at previous time points.  This gives us a statistical framework for modeling dependence or predictability 
between a subsequent attack and earlier successful attacks.  In this case, we assume a first-order model with the 
subsequent attack tactic dependent only on the tactic utilized in the most temporally adjacent attack. 
 
We apply an algorithm to compute the CPDs that estimate the likelihood of a specific tactic or combination of 
tactics happening in the next successful attack subsequent to the immediately prior attack as a function of the 
tactic employed in the prior attack.  Our modeling procedure treats each attack tactic, including combined tactics, 
as equally likely to happen in an attack.  However, the actual tactics employed in the immediately prior attack 
have different prior probability based on what actually happened for the set of all attacks, thus using these prior 
probabilities (i.e., known probabilities based on the empirical data) could potentially improve prediction.   
 
We created a subset of the data by filtering the 2,130 attacks to remove records that do not satisfy the primary 
attack criteria to estimate the prior probabilities for all attack tactics.  Next, we group attacks by day to identify 
those days that involved either a single attack or multiple attacks on the same day.  This filtering results in the 
following numbers of days with attacks for each leader: al-Zarqawi (86), al-Masri (142), and al-Baghdadi (452).  
The application of this filter reveals that incendiaries were used in very few attacks (n = 4).  For this reason, the 
analysis excludes incendiary attacks.  The resulting dataset of successful days of attacks (n = 680) involving the 
use of firearms, explosives, hostage-taking/kidnapping, and any combination of those tactics is used to construct 
                                                 
28 Kai Wang, Mingyao Li, Dexter Hadley, Rui Liu, Joseph Glessner, Struan F.A. Grant, Hakon Hakonarson, and Maja Bucan, 
“PennCNV: An Integrated Hidden Markov Model Designed for High-Resolution Copy Number Variation Detection in Whole-
Genome SNP Genotyping Data,” Genome Research 17:11 (2007): 1665–1674; Leonard E. Baum, Ted Petrie, George Soules, and 
Norman Weiss, (1970), “A Maximization Technique Occurring in the Statistical Analysis of Probabilistic Functions of Markov Chains,” 
Annals of Mathematical Statistics 41:1 (1970): 164–171. 
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the attack tactic-specific state transition matrices needed to model the dynamics of IS’s terrorist operations in 
terms of attack tactics.   
 
We use the sequences of attacks for each leader to form a state transition table shown in Table 7.  Performing 
summation along the columns and the rows of the table and then dividing by the total number of attacks yields 
the marginal probability distributions associated with the current 𝑝(𝑥𝑘) and prior attacks 𝑝(𝑥𝑘−1), respectively.  
In contrast, dividing the values within the individual cells of the table provides the joint probability distribution 
of the current and prior attack states 𝑝(𝑥𝑘 ,  𝑥𝑘−1).  The percentage in each cell of Table 7 corresponds to the 
conditional probability of the next attack given the current attack expressed as 𝑝(𝑥𝑘 ,  𝑥𝑘−1), while the number of 
occurrences (n) is more associated with the joint distribution because it represents the number of times that a 
specific attack sequence happened. 
 
The application of a Chi-Squared test for independence provides a straightforward technique to for determining 
whether the relationship between the current and prior attack types is a chance occurrence (i.e., random).  We 
employ a p ≤ 0.05 threshold for significance testing with the 95% confidence interval to reject the null hypothesis 
that 𝑥𝑘 and 𝑥𝑘−1 are independent.  The rejection of the null hypothesis implies the conditional probability of an 
attack given the prior attack 𝑝(𝑥𝑘  | 𝑥𝑘−1) is not equal to the marginal probability of an attack 𝑝(𝑥𝑘).  That is, the 
tactic for the current attack is dependent on the tactic employed in the prior attack.   
 
The results are not consistent across the three IS leadership eras.  Under al-Zarqawi, the choice of tactic for the 
current attack,  𝑥𝑘 , was dependent on the choice of tactic used for the prior attack and 𝑥𝑘−1 (χ2 = 19.38; df = 9; p 
≤ 0.05).  The relationship between tactic selection in the prior attack and the choice of tactic for the subsequent 
attack has become even stronger under al-Baghdadi’s leadership of IS (χ2 = 14.91; df = 9; p ≤ 0.001).  The pattern, 
however, did not hold under al-Masri’s leadership with the prior attack’s tactical choice not being a good 
predictor of the tactic employed in the subsequent attack (χ2 = 30.68; df = 9; p > .05).  This indicates greater 
variability in attack sequences compared to either al-Zarqawi or al-Baghdadi.  On an overall basis, this suggests it 
may be possible if a coherent pattern emerges to predict accurately the likely tactics employed in a subsequent 
attack based on the tactics used for the most immediately prior attack.   
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Implications for the Future  
IS embodies each of the characteristics that the 9/11 Commission identified as necessary for executing complex 
terrorist attacks: (1) leadership; (2) communications; (3) system to recruit, vet, and train members; (4) 
intelligence collection; (5) moving personnel to targets; and (6) financing.29  Moreover, because the number and 
diversity of attacks spanning multiple years is sufficient to identify statistically significant patterns, the preceding 
analysis provides a series of insights about continuity and change in the evolution of the operational dynamics of 
the self-proclaimed Islamic State and its predecessors.  When placed in a broad historical and strategic context, 
the  results illuminate two key issues that have implications for future developments in the ongoing effort by the 
United States and its allies to degrade and ultimately defeat the Salafist jihadist movement. First, what has been 
the efffect of leadership changes in the IS movement on its operational dynamics? Second, what are the 
implications for counterterrorism efforts?  
 
Our analysis has a number of conceptual, theoretical, and policy implications, which we raise here.  We note, first 
from its initial emergence under al-Zarqawi through its current form under al-Baghdadi, IS has remained a 
coherent organization capable of conducting an active terrorist campaign guided by an identifiable leadership 
and chain of command.  Despite successful decapitation of much of its senior and middle level leadership, 
combined with attrition of its followers through death or capture at multiple points in time (i.e., the al-Zarqawi 
and al-Masri eras), the group has demonstrated resiliency and been able to reconstitute itself and even expand 
especially under al-Baghdadi.   
 
We attribute this regenerative capacity to the fact that the Islamic State is not a leaderless phenomenon 
characterized by self-radicalizing individuals with limited capacity for sustaining terrorist operations as 
characterized by Sageman.30  Instead, it combines 21st century use of social media and affiliates with the 
traditional attributes of a coherent organizational structure including top-down command and control; these 
features are indications that organization is essential rather than irrelevant to sustaining an insurgency and/or 
                                                 
29 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (New York: Norton, 2004), available at: http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm. 
30 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
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ongoing terrorist campaigns.31  In addition, although the Islamic State’s structure is hierarchical, its collective 
leadership appears to set strategy and provide operational guidance rather than make micro-adjustments to the 
tactics employed for and target sets of day-to-day operations.  Moreover, unlike classical psychological depictions 
of the terrorist ‘mind’ and milieu, IS has succeeded in avoiding having its membership face the psychological 
problem of leading a ‘double life’.32  Instead, throughout its existence, recruits to the group typically do not lead 
‘double lives’ as happened with the Real IRA or other more traditional covert terrorist groups but have more in 
common with insurgents or rebels.33  In addition, given its roots in the radical variant of political Islam, the group 
has engaged individuals in collectively forming cohesive bonds grounded in a shared worldview that sanctions 
violence as religiously mandated with tangible satisfaction derived from participation in violent actions.  In 
essence, the process of Islamic radicalization has a fundamentally political valence albeit one grounded in 
religious ideology.34  As a result, although eliminating leadership per se has proven sufficient as a 
counterterrorism measure to defeat terrorist group lacking a broader base for support, the IS experience calls into 
question the assumption that decapitation is sufficient as a counterterrorism measure to defeat what essentially is 
a social movement using terrorism as a tactic to advance its agenda.  We note this caveat applies even though IS 
support is obtained, in part, by extremely violent coercion using graphic media images of savagery.   
 
Second, IS adopted an explicit and cunning goal-oriented strategy, especially achieving actual control over 
territory and creating a caliphate, in order to expand geographically and attract new followers.  The group 
communicates its strategy unambiguously to its adherents and adversaries alike.  As a result, the combination of 
IS-inspired and directed attacks publicized widely allowed IS to transform itself from a subordinate al-Qa’ida 
                                                 
31 Bruce Hoffman and Fernando Reinares, eds., The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2014); Bruce Hoffman, “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs 3 (2008): 133-138. 
32 John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2014); Jerrold M. Post, Leaders and Their 
Followers in a Dangerous World (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Jerrold M. Post, “Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist 
Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces,” in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990). 
33 Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
34 Willem Koomen and Joop Van Der Pligt, The Psychology of Radicalization and Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2016); M. 
Crone, “Radicalization Revisited: Violence, Politics and the Skills of the Body,” International Affairs 92, no. 3 (2016): 584-604; 
Peter R. Neumann, “The trouble with radicalization,” International Affairs 89:4 (2013): 873–93; Randy Borum, “Radicalization 
into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” Journal of Strategic Security 4:4 (2011): 7–36. 
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affiliate into an independent actor replacing al-Qa’ida as the most prominent player in the jihadist movement in 
less than a decade.  At the same time, corrupt and often unstable or repressive governments that do not capture 
the loyalty of their people and people who lack the ability to influence their governments creates an 
environmental milieu favorable for propagating the jihadist message that violence is the only means to replace 
near enemy despots with a ‘true’ regime. 
 
Third, despite conventional wisdom, contemporary Islamic radicalism is best understood as a social movement 
waging an insurgency against its perceived near and far enemies rather than as either so-called ‘lone wolves’ or 
amorphous groups.  IS has tapped into a polymorphous social movement grounded in a shared Salafist religious 
ideology and world view that provides entre to the jihadist groups through social media, websites and 
propaganda.  The overarching religious valence of the movement is a vehicle for building linkages between 
individuals that transcend kinship and national boundaries thereby attracting individuals to join IS-based on 
perception that violence is justified and necessary to revitalize Islam.35  We postulate the failure of Iraq to bridge 
Sunni-Shia sectarian animosities and the chaos engendered by the ongoing Syrian civil war fits well with the IS 
narrative that it is a Sunni social movement defending its followers and sympathizers against multiple 
adversaries and threats. 
 
We offer several caveats with respect to IS.  Unlike al-Qa’ida under the leadership of bin Laden or al-Zawahiri, the 
formal establishment of a caliphate with controlled territory is simultaneously a strength and weakness for IS.  It 
serves as a strong recruiting magnet for foreign fighters including Westerners, which has made it possible to 
expand members and maintain operational tempo even when the group has suffered attrition due to 
counterterrorism activities.  However, because a caliphate is a distinct geographical concept, it also can become a 
potential vulnerability for exploitation.  In essence, having declared himself caliph, it becomes necessary under 
al-Baghdadi’s leadership for the Islamic State to sustain control over and ideally expand the caliphate’s spatial 
domain thereby offering a focused target for the group’s adversaries.  Loss of the ability to control territory, in 
fact, may be the group’s long-term Achilles heel.  For example, as of early-January 2017, tactical defeats on the 
battlefield resulted in the loss of large swathes of territory including key towns like Ramadi and Fallujah.  
However, the group’s continued occupation of Mosul despite the Iraqi government’s counteroffensives supported 
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by US airpower and Special Operations Forces symbolically offsets those losses.  Similarly, after its initial 
expansion into Libya, the group lost control of its haven in Sirte making Libya less likely as a “fallback” option.  
Nonetheless, even as the Islamic State’s ability maintain control of its caliphate in the Middle East becomes more 
tenuous, IS  has launched and inspired successful terrorist attacks in Europe, North America, Australia, and Asia.  
Moreover, although the group’s ability to control territory is disintegrating especially in Iraq, the demise of the IS 
caliphate and/or the group itself—a laudable goal—would probably not cause the larger jihadist movement to 
collapse or become a disconnected set of self-radicalized ‘lone wolves’ or amorphous terrorist groups.  
Nonetheless, this may be the most serious threat to the long-term viability of IS. 
 
We also offer the caveat that it is important, however, to avoid equating defeating IS and abolishing its caliphate 
in portions of Iraq and Syria with ending the global jihadist movement.  Unfortunately, the weight of evidence 
encompassing such diverse groups as Narodnaya Volya (People’s Will) in Czarist Russia, the Irish Republican 
Army, Basque Homeland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA), and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) is not compelling.  The historical experience 
of each of those groups demonstrates that transforming the viability of a larger social movement does not happen 
automatically simply by terminating a highly ideological group’s ability to engage in terrorism.  This follows 
because the goal of the former is to deter or prevent specific forms of behavior while the latter inherently involves 
beliefs not just actions to galvanize and empower followers of a cause.  Ironically, if the US finds common cause 
with Russia and Iran to degrade or destroy IS, this may provide visual ‘evidence’ reinforcing the jihadist narrative 
that Islam is under attack by adversaries who jihadists already view as infidels and apostates respectively.  It is 
possible, therefore, that even a defeated IS may give rise to a successor entity unless the jihadist movement 
becomes unable to sustain a critical mass of adherents.   
 
Overall, the results reveal much about driving factors that have contributed to the group’s ability to sustain and 
increase or decrease its operational dynamics.  To disregard these insights is to misunderstand the dynamics of IS 
and the context in which it exists.  In essence, IS poses a multi-level threat that simultaneously is a domestic or 
indigenous (i.e., within Iraq and Syria respectively), transnational (i.e., cutting across Iraq and Syria), and 
international (i.e., beyond its center of gravity in Iraq and Syria) phenomenon.  In addition, with the exception of 
the Kurdish Peshmerga and YPG forces or the Iraqi "Golden Division" counterterrorism forces that are essentially 
light infantry, the reality on the ground to date offers strong evidence that IS confronts local military adversaries 
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with marginal commitment to battle, especially grueling urban combat.  Hence, given the inherent weakness of 
the group’s domestic adversaries in Iraq and Syria, the conventional wisdom asserts that success in defeating IS 
requires a multidimensional approach based on a coalition between local and outside actors.  IS, however, does 
not pose a co-equal threat to each of the prospective relatively pro-US anti-IS coalition partners (e.g., the EU 
countries, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Turkey, and the Kurds) let alone those countries aligned with the Assad 
regime in Syria (i.e., Russia and Iran and the Shia-led government of Iraq).   
 
Simply put, in the wake of direct Russian and Iranian military intervention in Syria coupled with Iranian 
influence in Iraq, a long-term commitment to ground combat operations and post-intervention stabilization 
executed jointly by Western and Gulf state forces no longer remains a viable policy option for the United States 
and its allies going forward.  Although such a course of action remains feasible theoretically, a resurgent Russia’s 
expanded projection of power in the Middle East including an active air campaign combined with Iran’s 
emergence from international sanctions in support of the Assad regime constitute serious constraints to pursuing 
such action unilaterally even if it were not questionable politically.  It strains credulity to conclude that Russia 
and/or Iran would agree to a cooperative effort with the US and other states having equities in the Middle East 
that results in a political bargain, which diminishes seriously their own gains on the battlefield.  Moreover, the 
failure to date of American efforts to field a moderate Syrian opposition as a viable military counterweight to both 
IS and the Assad regime demonstrates the absence of an effective local Sunni Arab partner as an alternative to the 
Assad regime and/or IS.  In addition, without such a Syrian partner, implementing post-intervention stabilization 
consistent with US national security interests becomes a dubious exercise regardless of the outcome of any 
political settlement and the ultimate fate of the Assad regime.  Hence, even if such a course of action becomes a 
political imperative for the West, the weight-of-evidence suggests that the ‘military and political window’ has 
closed dramatically for unilateral action by a US-led coalition to defeat IS in Syria and Iraq.   
 
Conclusion  
As a result, developments internationally coupled with the Islamic State’s demonstrated capability to plan and 
conduct attacks within and beyond Iraq and Syria despite the significant loss of controlled territory and fighters 
on the battlefield make it likely that IS will sustain some base level of operational capability at least for the near-
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term and possibly beyond the next few years.36  We conclude this implies the likelihood of ongoing 
counterterrorism activities aimed at targeting IS and its adherents even as the group continues to suffer 
battlefield losses in its insurgency centered on Iraq and Syria.  Moreover, when placed in a broad historical and 
strategic context, we postulate that eliminating IS and its physical caliphate is unlikely to be a sufficient condition 
to end the global jihadist movement as a social phenomenon.  This is not an argument against seeking 
aggressively to counter IS which is a desirable policy objective but, instead, to recognize that eliminating groups 
such as al-Qa’ida or the self-proclaimed Islamic State is not synonymous with removing the threat of violent 
extremism emanating from adherents to the jihadist movement.  The two objectives are distinct.  It is essential to 
avoid conflating them in designing and evaluating security policy to address the jihadist threat.   
 
Because this may compel policymakers to re-examine core assumptions underlying the conventional wisdom in 
order to identify and pursue a coherent, cohesive strategy, we close with four observations.  First, rhetoric is not a 
substitute for strategy.  Second, strategy can guide actions to achieve an end state but does not constitute an end 
state per se.  Third, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are not synonyms even when some of the tactical 
responses to both are identical.  Fourth, and perhaps most critically, the commitment of adequate resources and 
sustained political will to apply those resources to execute strategy is essential to the prospects for success of 
campaigns designed to counter terrorism or insurgency, especially when a terrorist and/or insurgent group 
emerges within broader social movements.   
 
  
                                                 
36 Kilcullen, Blood Year. 
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Table 4.  Joint distribution of attacks over tactics and target for the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 
leadership period. 
 
 Firear
m 
Explosive
s 
(Vehicle-
borne) 
Explosive
s 
(Suicide) 
Explosive
s (Other) 
Hostage/Kidnappin
g 
Incendiar
y 
Othe
r 
Civilian 1.0%  
(n=1) 
4.0%  
(n=4) 
2.0%  
(n=2) 
4.0%  
(n=4) 
8.0%  
(n=8) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
Government 5.0% 
 (n=5) 
4.0%  
(n=4) 
0.0% 
 (n=0) 
5.0%  
(n=5) 
1.0% 
 (n=1) 
0.0% 
 (n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
Military 1.0% 
 (n=1) 
5.0% 
 (n=5) 
2.0% 
 (n=2) 
3.0% 
 (n=3) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0% 
 (n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
Police 5.0% 
 (n=5) 
9.0% 
 (n=9) 
9.0%  
(n=9) 
2.0%  
(n=2) 
1.0%  
(n=1) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
Journalists/Medi
a 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0% 
 (n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
1.0%  
(n=1) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0% 
 (n=0) 
Religious Entities 1.0% 
 (n=1) 
1.0%  
(n=1) 
2.0%  
(n=2) 
1.0%  
(n=1) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0% 
 (n=0) 
Infrastructure 0.0%  
(n=0) 
2.0%  
(n=2) 
5.0%  
(n=5) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
4.0%  
(n=4) 
1.0%  
(n=1) 
1.0% 
 (n=1) 
Foreign 
Government 
2.0%  
(n=2) 
2.0% 
 (n=2) 
1.0% 
 (n=1) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
4.0%  
(n=4) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
Rival Groups 0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
Other 0.0%  
(n=0) 
1.0%  
(n=1) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
Regens and Mould: Operational Dynamics of the Islamic State
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2017
   
 
78 
 
Table 5.  Joint distribution of attacks over tactics and targets for the Abu Ayyub al-Masri 
leadership period. 
 
 Firear
m 
Explosive
s 
(Vehicle-
borne) 
Explosive
s 
(Suicide) 
Explosive
s (Other) 
Hostage/Kidnappin
g 
Incendiar
y 
Othe
r 
Civilian 8.4%  
(n=17) 
10.9%   
(n=22) 
6.4%  
(n=13) 
6.9%  
(n=14) 
5.4% 
 (n=11) 
0.5%  
(n=1) 
1.0% 
 (n=2) 
Government 3.5%  
(n=7) 
6.4%  
(n=13) 
1.0%  
(n=2) 
6.4%  
(n=13) 
1.0%  
(n=2) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.5%  
(n=1) 
Military 0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
1.5%  
(n=3) 
0.5% 
 (n=1) 
0.0% 
 (n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.5%  
(n=1) 
Police 2.5% 
 (n=5) 
3.0%  
(n=6) 
2.0% 
 (n=4) 
2.5% 
 (n=5) 
1.5%  
(n=3) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
1.0%  
(n=2) 
Journalists/Medi
a 
0.5%  
(n=1) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
Religious Entities 0.0%  
(n=0) 
2.5%  
(n=5) 
1.0%  
(n=2) 
4.0%  
(n=8) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0% 
 (n=0) 
Infrastructure 0.5% 
 (n=1) 
2.5%  
(n=5) 
0.5%  
(n=1) 
4.0%  
(n=8) 
1.0%  
(n=2) 
1.0%  
(n=2) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
Foreign 
Government 
0.5%  
(n=1) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0% 
 (n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
Rival Groups 3.5% 
 (n=7) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
2.0% 
 (n=4) 
1.0%  
(n=2) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
1.5%  
(n=3) 
Other 0.5% 
 (n=1) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.5%  
(n=1) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
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Table 6.  Joint distribution of attacks over tactics and target for the Abu Bakr al Baghdadi 
leadership period. 
 
 Firear
m 
Explosive
s 
(Vehicle) 
Explosive
s 
(Suicide) 
Explosive
s (Other) 
Hostage/Kidnappin
g 
Incendiar
y 
Other 
Civilian 1.4%  
(n=25) 
21.3%  
(n=389) 
1.0%  
(n=18) 
16.5%  
(n=302) 
4.2%  
(n=76) 
0.2% 
 (n=4) 
2.4% 
 
(n=43
) 
Government 1.0%  
(n=19) 
1.8% 
 (n=32) 
0.8% 
 (n=15) 
1.9%  
(n=35) 
0.4%  
(n=7) 
0.0% 
 (n=0) 
0.2%  
(n=3) 
Military 0.3% 
 (n=5) 
1.7%  
(n=31) 
0.2% 
 (n=3) 
1.0% 
 (n=19) 
0.3%  
(n=6) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.3%  
(n=6) 
Police 3.4% 
 (n=62) 
5.7%  
(n=104) 
0.6%  
(n=11) 
8.7% 
 (n=159) 
1.9%  
(n=35) 
0.1%  
(n=2) 
0.5%  
(n=9) 
Journalists/Medi
a 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.1%  
(n=1) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
1.5%  
(n=28) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.1%  
(n=1) 
Religious Entities 0.1% 
 (n=2) 
1.0%  
(n=18) 
0.2%  
(n=4) 
1.5%  
(n=28) 
0.4%  
(n=7) 
0.1% 
 (n=2) 
0.3%  
(n=6) 
Infrastructure 0.5%  
(n=10) 
4.3%  
(n=78) 
0.4%  
(n=8) 
4.2%  
(n=77) 
0.7%  
(n=13) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.7%  
(n=13) 
Foreign 
Government 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.1%  
(n=2) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.1%  
(n=1) 
0.1%  
(n=1) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
Rival Groups 1.0%  
(n=19) 
1.1%  
(n=20) 
0.4%  
(n=8) 
1.0% 
 (n=18) 
0.8% 
 (n=14) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.3%  
(n=5) 
Other 0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.4%  
(n=8) 
0.2%  
(n=3) 
0.6%  
(n=11) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
0.1% 
 (n=2) 
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Table 7.  Islamic State next attack probability conditioned on current attack type for each 
leadership period. 
 
  Next Attack Type Probability and Number of Occurrences by 
Leader 
Leadership Firearm Explosives Hostage/Kidnapping Combination 
Current 
Attack 
Type 
Firearm 
Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi 
36.4%  
(n=4) 
27.3%  
(n=3) 
18.2%  
(n=2) 
18.2%  
(n=2) 
Abu Ayyub al-
Masri 
16.7%  
(n=5) 
76.7%  
(n=23) 
6.7%  
(n=2) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
Abu Bakr al 
Baghdadi 
14.3%  
(n=5) 
60.0%  
(n=21) 
5.7% 
 (n=2) 
20.0%  
(n=7) 
Explosives 
Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi 
11.8%  
(n=6) 
64.7%  
(n=33) 
23.5%  
(n=12) 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
Abu Ayyub al-
Masri 
20.5%  
(n=18) 
64.8%  
(n=57) 
9.1% 
 (n=8) 
5.7%  
(n=5) 
Abu Bakr al 
Baghdadi 
8.6%  
(n=19) 
56.1%  
(n=124) 
6.3%  
(n=14) 
29.0%  
(n=64) 
Hostage/Kidnapping 
Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi 
11.1%  
(n=2) 
72.2%  
(n=13) 
5.6%  
(n=1) 
11.1% 
 (n=2) 
Abu Ayyub al-
Masri 
28.6%  
(n=4) 
28.6%  
(n=4) 
21.4%  
(n=3) 
21.4% 
 (n=3) 
Abu Bakr al 
Baghdadi 
3.1%  
(n=1) 
53.1%  
(n=17) 
15.6%  
(n=5) 
28.1%  
(n=9) 
Combination 
Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi 
0.0%  
(n=0) 
40.0%  
(n=2) 
40.0%  
(n=2) 
20.0%  
(n=1) 
Abu Ayyub al-
Masri 
33.3% 
 (n=3) 
44.4%  
(n=4) 
11.1%  
(n=1) 
11.1% 
(n=1) 
Abu Bakr al 
Baghdadi 
6.1%  
(n=10) 
36.8% 
 (n=60) 
6.7%  
(n=11) 
50.3% 
 (n=82) 
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